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A Dutiful Child: The Implications of Article 31 of
the African Children's Charter
J Sloth-Nielsen* and BD Mezmur**
Abstract
Each right has a corresponding duty. The African Children's Charter, under article
31, imposes a range of duties on children. Understandably, it could become
contentious when an instrument on the rights and welfare of children expressly
imposes duties on them. After setting the platform for discussion by highlighting
international experiences and outlining the African concept of human rights, this
article critically examines and attempts to clarify the precise meaning, content,
conditions of compliance and application of those duties for children- By way of
conclusion, it suggests that article 31 represents a valuable addition to the
international human rights agenda, and that a purposeful interpretation of its
constituent parts reveals that children should be required to play a role at family,
community, national and continental levels, in accordance with their age and
maturity as they grow up, as part and parcel of their heritage, empowerment and
developing citizenship.
INTRODUCTION
The point is often made that each right has a corresponding duty. Hence,
the right of an individual implies a duty on the part of society to respect
that right. A contrary reading of this conveys the message that every
individual, in enjoying their rights, also owes a duty on his or her part
towards society.1 In the words of Coony, even "[t]he Bible emphasizes duties
and responsibilities (not rights). The Ten Commandments are duties ... The
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1 This garners support in Rousseau's social contract which presupposed reciprocal
rights and responsibilities and "assumed a considerable degree of communal
coherence, and the existence of a social ethic of public responsibility, as part of the
heritage of feudal society": AR Chapman "Reintegrating rights and responsibilities:
Toward a new human rights paradigm" in KW Hunter and TC Mack (eds) International
Rights and Responsibility for the Future (1996, Praeger) 3 at 9.
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emphasis on rights to the near exclusion of duties and responsibilities in
modern society is a challenge."
2
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1949 (UDHR), including its
preamble and all 30 operative articles, has been, and continues to be, a
source of inspiration and direction for the standard-setting activities of the
UN and the international community at large in the field of human rights.
Not only because of its balancing of civil, cultural, economic, political and
social rights, but "together with its express reference to duties and an
international order for the realization of the rights",3 the UDHR occupies a
special place in the international human rights discourse. Thus, the UDHR
addresses the issue of an individual's responsibilities, as article 29(1) states
that "[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible". However, the UDHR does
not codify these duties in detail. There are those who argue that this is a
deficiency,4 and that there should be a parallel Universal Declaration of
Human Responsibilities to fill this perceived gap.
Partly influenced by the UDHR, the preambles of both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 as well as the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 6 both of 1966, refer to the
duties of the individual. The covenants refer to the individual's "duties to
other individuals and to the community to which he belongs". 7
However, a more specific and detailed range of duties of the individual is
the trademark of the African human rights system. The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter or ACHPR) has codified a
number of duties the individual owes to the community, the state and his/
her parents.8 The proponents of this approach argue that, far from duties
creating an environment for a gratuitous invasion of rights, duties should
2 M Coony The Australian Achievement, available at: <http://www.ourcivilisation.com
cooray/btof/chap226.htm> (last accessed 14 November 2007).
3 G Alfredsson and A Eide "Introduction" in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds) The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999, Martinus Nijhoff) i
at xxix.
4 For instance, the Inter Action Council and the 1993 Parliament of the World's
Religions. The Inter Action Council's introduction to its Declaration of Human
Responsibilities states that it therefore "seeks to bring freedom and responsibility
into balance and to promote a move from the freedom of indifference to the freedom
of involvement". The 1993 Parliament of the World's Religions Declaration towards a
Global Ethic states: "Action in favour of rights and freedoms presumes a conscious-
ness of responsibility and duty, and that therefore both the minds and hearts of
women and men must be addressed; that rights without morality cannot long
endure, and that there will be no better global order without a global ethic."
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly res 2200A (XXI),
21 UN GAOR supp (no 16) at 52, UN doc A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171, entered into force
23 March 1976.
6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly
res 2200A (XXI), 21 UNGAOR supp (no 16) at 49, UN doc A/6316 (1966) 993 UNTS 3,
entered into force 3 January 1976.
7 Para 5 of the preambles of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
8 See arts 27-29 of the ACHPR.
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be understood as reinforcing rights. 9 Nonetheless, some have also argued
that, although a balance is required between rights and duties, it is not the
task of international instruments to deal with them in equal depth.'0
Concerns are raised at the possible abuse of the language of duties (by
governments) to curtail the rights of individuals." At the extreme, the
possibility of governments making the enjoyment of human rights
dependent on the fulfilment of duties towards the state is feared as having
a suspiciously illiberal ring.
But nowhere else is the language of duties more contentious than in the
field of children's rights, in so far as an instrument on the rights and
welfare of children expressly imposes a range of duties on them. Such is the
case with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(African Children's Charter),' 2 the treaty which constitutes the central
theme of this article. In a vein similar to that of the African Charter, the
African Children's Charter imposes a range of duties on the child, duties
which are owed to his/her parents, the community and the state. 13 This
inclusion of duties of the child under the African Children's Charter has
attracted criticism from some scholars.' 4
After introducing the subject matter for discussion, the second part of
this article looks at the language of duties/responsibilities of the individual
from the perspective of international human rights instruments. The
UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)15 and some of the regional treaties are presented for brief analysis.
Following this, the third section starts with the premise that, in order to
understand the "language of duties" in the African human rights system,
one needs to have an informed view of the general concept of human rights
in Africa. With this background, the section discusses the language of
9 NB Pityana "The challenge of culture for human rights in Africa" in M Evans and R
Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System In Practice 1986-
2000 (2002, Cambridge University Press) 219 at 230.
10 T Opsahl and V Dimitrijevic "Articles 29 and 30" in Alfredsson and Eide (eds) The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, above at note 3, 633 at 637.
11 See, for instance, International Human Rights Policy Taking Duties Seriously: Individual
Duties in International Human Rights Law; A Commentary (1999, International Human
Rights Policy Council).
12 The African Children's Charter is the first comprehensive regional children's rights
treaty specifically dedicated to children in Africa. African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (1990) OAU doc CABILEG/24.9/49.
13 Art 31 of the African Children's Charter.
14 D Olowu "Protecting children's rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child" (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children's
Rights 127; D Chirwa "The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child" (2002) 10 International Journal on Children's Rights 157; A Lloyd
"Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the
African Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet" (2002) 10 International Journal of
Children's Rights 179; M Gose The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2002,
Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape).
15 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted November 1989 and
entered into force September 1990).
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duties under the ACHPR. The article examines the potential meanings and
jurisprudential implications of such duties.
The fourth section, which is central to the article, looks at the duties of
children under the African Children's Charter. Some of the questions this
section attempts to address include: What duties could children possibly
have? How could these duties be imposed on children without violating
their rights? What standards could these duties be assessed against to
ensure their legality? And what are the implications of enforcing these
duties? In summary, this part attempts to clarify the precise meaning (as
much as possible), content, conditions of compliance and application of
those duties for children. A concluding section sums up the article.
THE LANGUAGE OF DUTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
As alluded to above, at the international level the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR
make reference to the duties of the individual. Although largely focused on
the individual, the UDHR opens with a deeply moral paragraph stating that
"[aIll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of brotherhood". 16 The UDHR states that "[elveryone has duties to
the community in which alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible", 17 and many other human rights instruments adopt
similar language.18 The reference to duties in article 29(1) is adopted in the
preambles of the ICCPR and ICESCR: "the individual, having duties to other
individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of ... [human]
rights".19 This is indicative of the fact that the drafters of the two covenants
supported the idea expressed in article 29 of the UDHR. There are also a
number of declarations that incorporate the concept of "duties": two
examples being the Declaration on the Right to Development 20 and the
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. 21 However, none of the 41
substantive provisions of the CRC expressly imposes duties on the child.
Throughout the CRC, duty bearers seem to be parents and the state.
Although finding an authoritative interpretation of article 29 of the
UDHR is no easy task, writers have commented that article 29 should be
interpreted in accordance with article 30 of the UDHR: ie in no way to limit
16 Art 1 of the UDHR.
17 Art 29(1) of the UDHR.
18 See, for instance, "The African Charter and the Asian Human Rights Commission, our
common humanity: Asian Human Rights Charter - A people's charter", available at:
<http://www.ahrchk.net/index.php> (last accessed 4 October 2007).
19 Para 5 of the preambles of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
20 General Assembly res 411128, 4 December 1986.
21 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms: General Assembly res 53/144, 8 March 1999.
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the human rights of the individual. 22 Article 30 of the UDHR proclaims that
nothing in the declaration "may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein". It has been remarked that the travaux preparatoires suggest an
interpretation of article 29 based on the terms in paragraph 1 about
personal development (because article 29(1) reads that "(e)veryone has
duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of
his personality is possible"), to the extent of recognizing an implicit right to
revolt, of which the preamble speaks openly.23
The recognition of duties in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR (international
bill of rights) is expanded upon in a number of regional human rights
treaties, which indicate the creative possibilities open to local communities
to elaborate upon, and particularize, the general duties contained in
international instruments. Apart from the African Charter, which is
discussed in detail in the next section, both the European and inter-
American human rights systems briefly entrench the duties of the
individual.
There is only one reference to duties of the individual under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 10 of this convention
declares, in the context of the right to freedom of expression, that "[t]he
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
maybe subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society...".
In contrast to the European system, more reference is made to duties in
the inter-American human rights system. Adopted in the same year as the
UDHR, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (along
with the American Convention on Human Rights)24 establishes the inter-
American human rights system. The very title of the American declaration
demonstrates that express attention was paid to the duties of private actors.
In addition to a special section in the declaration emphasizing various
"duties", 25 the preamble also mentions other more general duties,
22 Opsahl and Dimitrijevic "Articles 29 and 30", above at note 10 at 638. Art 30 of the
UDHR proclaims that nothing in the declaration "may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein".
23 Opsahl and Dimitrijevic "Articles 29 and 30", above at note 10 at 638.
24 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS res XXX, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948); reprinted in "Basic
documents pertaining to human rights in the inter-American system", OEA/Ser.L.V/
11.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November
1969, 36 OAS TS, reprinted in 6 ILM 673 (American Convention).
25 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, chapter 2, arts XXIX-XXXVtI. For
example, art XXIX declares: "It is the duty of the individual so to conduct himself in
relation to others that each and every one may fully form and develop his personality";
art XXX adds duties with respect to family members: "It is the duty of every person to aid,
support, educate and protect his minor children, and it is the duty ofchildren to honour
their parents always and to aid, support and protect them when they need it".
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declaring: "[tihe fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to
the rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and
political activity of man. While rights exalt individual liberty, duties express
the dignity of that liberty".
The American Convention on Human Rights reiterates the general
expectation that the convention cannot correctly be interpreted as
"permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment
or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized ... or to restrict them to a
greater extent than is provided for herein". 26 The existence of duties of
group and individual actors was thereby recognized, albeit indirectly.
Additionally, article 32(1) of the American Convention recognizes that
"[e]very person has responsibilities to ... mankind", and article 32(2) affirms
that "[t]he rights of each person are limited by the rights of others ....
Although the language of duties has been used both in international and
regional treaties, clear and concise analysis of the content of these duties is
limited. The literature that exists around these treaties and their provisions
on duties is not of much help in establishing their substantive meaning
and scope of application, let alone for undertaking any comprehensive
comparative analysis. In addition, in comparison to the above treaties, the
detailed list of duties that the African Charter entrenches is significant. As a
result, it is deserving of, and given, substantial attention below.
THE AFRICAN CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE AFRICAN
CHARTER AND DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL
In order to understand the "language of duties" in the African human
rights system, one needs to have an informed view of the general concept of
human rights in Africa. This springs from the recognition that there is an
overwhelming body of literature and other evidence that indicates that the
emphasis on the group - the idea of communitarianism - is indeed a distinct
feature of traditional African culture. 27 The notion of protection of the
individual is a great advance over its absolutist antecedents, but the African
concept of human rights highlights that it needs to be balanced by the
acknowledgement that the individual is embedded within a community.
The importance of placing limits upon human assertiveness at all levels of
social organization is overlooked if the emphasis is placed only on the
protection of individuals. 28 Thus the African concept of human rights, both
traditional and contemporary, recognizes the importance of the group
simultaneously with the significance of the individual.29
26 Art 29(a) of the American Convention.
27 See, for instance, EK Quashigah et al Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and
Domestic Legal Perspectives (1999, Kluwer Law International) 190-91.
28 RA Falk Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World (2000,
Routledge) 88.
29 See, for instance, Quashigah et al Legitimate Governance in Africa, above at note 27.
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African human rights law refers to the various national, regional and
international legal instruments concerning the liberties of the people of
Africa. In the main, the regional African human rights system is based on
the African Charter.30
The African Charter is different from the European and inter-American
human rights systems in several respects. 31 Mutua argues that the most
notable contributions of the African Charter are the codification of the
three "generations" of rights, including the concept of peoples' rights and
the imposition of duties on individuals. 32 As Heyns succinctly states: "[tihe
importance of the group in African tradition is already reflected in the title
of the African Charter. Because the group or 'people' is considered to be the
basic unit of society, in contrast to the West where the individual plays the
predominant role, this document, which has been ratified by almost all
African states, is entitled the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights. '33 (emphasis added)
This difference between the African Charter and its counterparts could
have been influenced by the welcoming address of Leopold Senghor
(president of Senegal) in 1979 to the meeting of African experts preparing
the draft African Charter in Dakar, Senegal. After referring to the example
set by international human rights instruments, he said: "{als Africans, we
shall neither copy, nor strive for originality, for the sake of originality. We
must show imagination and effectiveness. We could get inspiration from
our beautiful and positive traditions. Therefore, you must keep constantly
in mind our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa." 34 The
African Charter's articulation of an individual's duties is a further
indication of its attempt to balance cultural relativism with universalism
in human rights.35
30 The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the official body of African
states. It is also known as the Banjul Charter because a final draft was adopted in the
capital of the Gambia, Banjul. The charter entered into force on October 1986 upon
ratification by a simple majority of member states of the OAU.
31 See generally 0 Okere "The protection of human rights in Africa and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Comparative analysis with the European and
American systems" (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 141.
32 See generally M Mutua "The African human rights system: A critical evaluation"
(1999), available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background-papers/
MUTUA.PDF> (last accessed 2 October 2007).
33 C Heyns "Where is the voice of Africa in our constitution" (occasional paper no 8, Centre
for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, 1996), available at: <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/
centre-publications/occ-papersocc8.html> (last accessed 3 October 2007).
34 Meeting of experts for the preparation of the draft African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (28 November - 8 December 1979), OAU doc CABHLEG/67/3/Rev.1, 5.
35 NJ Udombana "Between promise and performance: Revisiting states' obligations
under the African Human Rights Charter" (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law
105 at 111. While the principle of cultural relativity should not be raised to an absolute
standard to excuse any and all deviations from international human rights standards, it
may be used as a check on radical universalism in very carefully defined circumstances.
See RE Howard Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa (1986, Rowman and Littlefield) 17.
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In no uncertain terms, articles 27-29 of the African Charter provide for a
host of duties of the individual. These duties are owed to the family, society,
the state and even the international community. For example, article 27
entrenches that "[e]very individual shall have duties towards his family and
society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the
international community". It further substantiates this duty by providing
that "[tihe rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with
due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common
interest".3 6 In addition, "[e]very individual shall have the duty to respect
and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain
relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual
respect and tolerance". 37
A number of other both positive and negative duties of the individual are
provided for under article 29 of the African Charter. Under article 29(1), the
individual shall also have the duty "[tlo preserve the harmonious
development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of
the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of
need". Article 29 also lists the duties: "[tjo serve his national community by
placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service"; 38 "[t]o preserve
and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is
threatened"; 39 "[t]o preserve and strengthen the national independence
and the territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defence
in accordance with the law"; 40 "[rto work to the best of his abilities and
competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the
society"; 41 "[t]o preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in
his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance,
dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion
of the moral well being of society"; 42 and "[tlo contribute to the best of his
abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of
African unity".43
As a negative obligation, the individual also has the duty "[n]ot to
compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is" .44 In
the context of negative duties, which require people not to do something, it
is correctly argued that:
"[tihe existence of negative duties illustrate [sic] that the assumption that
rights and duties are necessarily antagonistic concepts, is largely
unfounded. By enforcing the duty to respect the rights of other persons
36 Art 27(2) of the ACHPR.
37 Id at art 28.
38 Id at art 29(2).
39 Id at art 29(4).
40 Id at art 29(5).
41 Id at art 29(6).
42 Id at art 29(7).
43 Id at art 29(8).
44 Id at art 29(3).
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against one person, one is in effect protecting the rights of those others.
This may be called the secondary protection of human rights, through the
enforcement of duties. In fact, the state's duty to respect and protect human
rights, which is recognized in the new draft, would also require it to ensure
this form of protection.
45
The inclusion of these duties in the African Charter drew the attention of
scholars and attracted some level of criticism. 4 6 For instance, the more
general charge against the imposition of duties on the individual is that
they would be construed as legitimizing state power to override individual
rights.
In addition, the "family" provisions have been thought to condone and
support repressive and retrogressive structures and practices of social and
political ordering. This is because the exercise of placing on the individual
duties to the family has been read to mean entrenching oppressive family
structures which marginalize and exclude women from participation in
most spheres outside the home.4 7 The duty to "strengthen positive African
values" has been labelled as ambiguous on the face of it; the inability
accurately to define the term "positive values", as well as the diversity of
those values and cultures across the African continent, has been seen to
create problems of interpretation and application.
48
The duty of the individual to serve his/her national community by
placing his/her physical and intellectual capacities at its service4 9 has been
attacked as dangerous, as it could justify obstacles to freedom of movement
of the nationals of a state.5 0 It is also argued that article 29(6), which
requires the individual "to work to the best of his abilities", could be used
to impose on the individual the obligation to work, possibly leading to
forced labour.
However, these fears and concerns, while sometimes understandable, are
often flawed and exaggerated, and as a result can be dismissed. The
violation of human rights in Africa has not been anchored in the notion of
45 Heyns "Where is the voice of Africa", above at note 33.
46 However, it is important to note that it is the relationship between peoples' and
human rights in the African Charter that has drawn more attention than the
language of duties. In fact, there has been little concrete discussion of the notion of
individual duties in the context of the African Charter. The only published article
devoted solely to the discussion of duties is written by M Mutua "The Banjul Charter and
the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties" (1995) 35
VirginiaJournal of International Law 339. See also NJ Udombana "'Arise, 0 Compatriots': An
analysis of 'duties of the citizen' in the Nigerian Constitution" (2002) 34 Zambia Law
Journal 24, discussing the concept of duties in constitutional and human rights law.
47 Mutua "The African human rights system", above at note 32 at 9.
48 Udombana "Between promise and performance", above at note 35.
49 Art 29(1) of the ACHPR.
50 W Benedek "Peoples' rights and individuals' duties as special features of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" in P Kunig et al (eds) Regional Protection of
Human Rights by International Law: The Emerging African System (1985, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft) 59 at 89.
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duties; rather, the most enduring causes of human rights abuse in Africa (as
elsewhere) are social stratification and the consolidation of political power
in the hands of a small ruling class.51 A progressive construction of the
African Charter is said to leave no room for the discriminatory treatment of
women.5 2 This argument is reinforced by the adoption and ratification of
the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa.53 The duty to promote
African unity has been described, in the recent past, as "an especially
critical role given arbitrary balkanization by the colonial powers and the
ethnic animosities fostered within and between the imposed states".5 4 With
regard to promoting "positive African values", Udombana argues, however,
that one plausible interpretation is that the African Charter favours African
rights to the extent that they do not collide with universal principles.5 5
According to Ouguergouz, the duty of the individual towards the family,
especially when applied to the nuclear family (two spouses and their
children), is normally sanctioned by domestic (civil or criminal) law. 56 The
individual's duty to respect his family5 7 (immediate or extended) and to
maintain and assist his parents is similar to that which is traditionally
placed on the individual by domestic law.58
Although there might be a justified concern that the right to movement
could be curtailed on the basis of article 29(2) of the African Charter, the
danger is negligible, as article 12(2) of the same instrument is unequivocal
in guaranteeing the individual's right to leave his or her country.59 In
addition, article 5 of the African Charter does not expressly prohibit
compulsory labour. However, the possibility that article 29(6) could legally
be used to impose a duty to work is minimal in the face of a number of
universal human rights standards that proscribe the practice. 60
Through the practice of the African Commission (which is the oversight
body for the implementation of the African Charter), article 27(2), which
reads that "[t]he rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised
with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and
common interest", has become perhaps the most significant provision as
51 Howard Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, above at note 35.
52 Mutua "The African human rights system", above at note 32 at 9.
53 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa (adopted July 2003, entered into force October 2005).
54 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 371.
55 Udombana "Between promise and performance", above at note 35 at 111.
56 F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003, Martinus Nijhoff) at 416.
57 Ouguergouz argues (ibid) that this is only of very limited legal scope and is rather a
moral obligation.
58 Ibid.
59 Art 12(2) provides "[elvery individual shall have the right to leave any country
including his own and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to
restrictions provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order,
public health or morality."
60 For instance, International Labour Organization Convention no 105 Concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labour, 25 June 1957.
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regards the individual's duties.61 This provision has now, in effect, been
given the status of a general limitation clause by the African Commission,
according to which "[tihe only legitimate reasons for limitations to the
rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found in Article 27(2)".62
It is plausibly argued that "Itihe Commission's use of Article 27(2) as a
general limitation clause seems to confirm the view that the concept of
'duties' should not be understood as a sinister way of saying rights should
first be earned, or that meeting certain duties is a precondition for enjoying
human rights".63 Rather, it is said to indicate that the exercise of human
rights, which are "natural" or valid in themselves, may be limited by the
duties of individuals. 64
With respect to duties, it has been suggested that the African Commission
should clarify which of the duties in the African Charter are moral or legal
obligations, and what the scope of their application ought to be.
65 Of
course, some of these issues continue to be open for debate. However, as
shown above, far from duties creating an environment for a gratuitous
invasion of rights, duties should be understood as reinforcing rights.66 The
acceptance and appreciation of the language of duties by Africans is further
reflected by the fact that they are not in short supply if one examines the
national constitutions of the different African states.67 The value of duties is
elevated further when one takes into account the fact that, in the modern
global environment, the key performers are not necessarily states but non-
state actors. 68 This is so because, if duties are not imposed on non-state
actors, their accountability is very minimal, and leeway is provided for the
violation of human rights by private actors. The next section examines
whether or not the same, and/or similar, duties imposed on a child could
be regarded as legally sound, and as reinforcing rights.
ARTICLE 31 OF THE AFRICAN CHILDREN'S CHARTER ON THE
DUTIES OF THE CHILD
Article 31 of the African Children's Charter entitled "Responsibility of the
Child" provides in full that:
61 vo Nmehielle "Development of the African human rights system in the last decade"
(2004) 11/3 Human Rights Brief 7.
62 OAU, African Commission, communications 140/94, 141/94 and 145/95: Constitutional
Rights Project & Others v Nigeria para 41, 13th Annual Activity Report (1999).
63 C Heyns "The African regional human rights system: The African Charter" (2004) 108
Pennsylvania State Law Review 679 at 692-93.
64 In other words, rights precede duties and the recognition of duties is merely another
way of signifying the kind of limitations that may be placed on rights: ibid.
65 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46.
66 Pityana "The challenge of culture", above at note 9.
67 For example, art 41(k) of the Constitution of Ghana recognizes the duty to protect the
environment. Likewise, art 33 of the Constitution of Benin recognizes the duty of
citizens "to fulfill all of their civic and professional responsibilities".
68 Pityana "The challenge of culture", above at note 9 at 230.
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"Every child shall have responsibilities towards his family and society, the
State and other legally recognized communities and the international
community. The child, subject to his age and ability, and such limitations as
may be contained in the present Charter, shall have the duty;
(a) to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors
and elders at all times and to assist them in case of need;
(b) to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual
abilities at its service;
(c) to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity;
(d) to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in his relations with
other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and
consultation and to contribute to the moral well-being of society;
(e) to preserve and strengthen the independence and the integrity of his
country;
(f) to contribute to the best of his abilities at all times and at all levels, to
the promotion and achievement of African unity."
One can decipher from the above that the preambular paragraph, which
introduces the specifics of article 31, contains within it two internal
limitations. First, the duties of the child are subject to his or her age and
ability. Secondly, the child's duties are subject to "such limitations as may
be contained in the present Charter".
The first qualifier entails an open-ended consideration of the child's
evolving capacity and ability, concepts which are now the hallmark of the
recognition of children's participation rights. The child's right to partici-
pate in matters affecting his or her life constitutes a core principle of the
CRC, and has long been regarded as the key to the rights-based philosophy
of children's rights that replaced welfarist protectionism, in terms of which
children were viewed as objects, rather than subjects, of human rights. "The
CRC makes it clear that parental direction and guidance to children must
be provided in accordance with the child's evolving capacities. It is through
participation that children are empowered to take greater responsibility for
the exercise of their own rights as they gain confidence and competence to
make informed choices." 69
One of the four rights identified by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, and now the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child, as forming the foundation of all the other rights referred to in
the CRC -participation - and the concomitant subjectivization of children as
independent bearers of human rights, rest on proven theories of child
development. The thinking is that the closer a child comes to adulthood,
the more weighty his/her role ought to be, as he/she matures. Domestic
and national laws also frequently provide, for example, for children's
69 See H Thorgeirsdottir "Article 13: The right to freedom of expression" in A Allen et al
(eds) A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (2006,
Martinus Nijhoff) 1 at 4.
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independent consent at an age younger than 18 (such as consent to medical
treatment, HIV testing or adoption), consistent with article 5 of the CRC on
the evolving maturity and development of children, and their ability to
understand the implications of decision-making in one or another area of
their life.
In much contemporary children's rights literature, participation is
narrowly construed as according children the right to express views, and
thereafter giving those views due weight in accordance with the children's
age and maturity.70 However, true participation cannot merely mean
having a voice, or a forum for expressing opinions, or an opportunity to
have a say independently or through a representative. The very word
"participate" - to join in, be part of - indicates physical activity beyond the
mere verbal or cerebral. Unlike the CRC provisions, article 31 contemplates
a form of active participation in societal and communal life at this practical
level, namely in respect of the fulfilment by children of their responsi-
bilities. The age and ability limitation, however, ensures that, as children
mature towards adulthood, their participation, via the fulfilment of duties,
is commensurate with their evolving status and their physical, mental,
emotional and other capacities.
The point is also that children mature into adulthood and do not
suddenly, upon attaining the age of 18 years, acquire the capacity and
ability to assume adult duties without having had any prior experience of
them. Indeed, it must surely be in the children's best interests not to enter
the wider world completely unprepared for what may be expected of them.
It is, of course, a reflection of the realities of African life that children are, in
practice, given the opportunity to participate in the tasks, chores and
traditions of adulthood before reaching the age of 18, so as to learn and
develop the skills necessary for later family life. So, for example, girl
children may be given, in accordance with their age and capacity at various
stages of their middle and teenage years, some duties relevant to the
preparation of food, tending and nurturing agricultural produce, or to
overseeing small livestock. Older children may be required to assist with the
rearing of younger siblings, and assisting with household tasks is common
to many of Africa's cultures, societies and groups, across rural and urban
settings. These are seen as part and parcel of growing up: learning to
assume responsibility; acquiring domestic and other skills; and preparing
for life itself.
However, as mentioned at the outset, the fact that duties are subject to a
limitation (the child's age and ability) clearly distinguishes the responsi-
bilities of the child from harmful or hazardous labour which is not
appropriate for their development or which interferes with their educa-
70 This is no doubt due to the express formulation of art 12(1) of the CRC, which states
that "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of
the child".
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tion. Indeed, the caution that article 31 opens the way to exploitation of
children within the family71 is misplaced: a correct reading views age- and
ability-appropriate duties as a positive way to involve children in the daily
life of the household and to enable them gradually to equip themselves for
life as adults. Nor is it true that the child is prematurely subject to adult
responsibilities, thus depriving him or her of the freedoms of childhood, as
the limitation inherent in the preambular phrase makes it all too clear that
children's responsibilities are to be commensurate with their age and stage
of development. 72
The second qualifier contained in article 31 of the African Children's
Charter clearly subjects the duties of the child to the general clauses, as well
as the specific protections, contained elsewhere in the African Children's
Charter's provisions. Having regard to the African Children's Charter
provisions protecting children from abuse, neglect and sexual exploitation,
it is untrue to suggest that the duty of a child to respect elders (for example)
can lead to the perpetuation of sexual abuse within the family,73 in that
children would be duty bound to obey even commands which violate their
rights. Nor is it fair to depict the "duty to respect superiors" as justification
for the recruitment of child soldiers by adults, as this is a clear
contravention of the charter, the normative provisions of which take
precedence over the duties provided for in article 31.
Finally, in understanding the overarching limitations in article 31, the
three general principles, not detailed in this section (the best interests of
the child, non-discrimination and the right to life survival and develop-
ment) must remain at the forefront. The pervading effect of these principles
is elaborated upon below in the discussion of the specific duties contained
in article 31.
The duty of the child to work for the cohesion of the family, to
respect his/her parents, superiors and elders at all times and assist
them in case of need
This duty comprises several elements, some of which are interlinked, whilst
others can be regarded as discrete. The constituent elements will be
expounded in turn.
71 See G Van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child (1995, Martinus Nijhoff)
at 76. See also W Ncube "Recognition and monitoring of children's rights in Africa:
Challenges and prospects" in E Verhellen (ed) Children's Rights (1997, Children's Rights
Centre, University of Ghent, Belgium) 609 at 613 for a similar sentiment.
72 GS Kamchedzera "The complementarity of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child" in E Verhellen (ed)
Children's Rights (1998, Children's Rights Centre, University of Ghent, Belgium) 549 at
563.
73 See, for instance, P Parkinson "Family law and parent-child contact: Assessing the risk
of sexual abuse" (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 345.
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The cohesion of the family
The duty towards the family is supplemented and reinforced by articles 18
and 19 of the African Children's Charter. Article 18 establishes the family as
the "natural unit and basis of society" and provides further that, as such,
the family is entitled to "the protection and support" of the state for its
establishment and development. That the concept of family is broad,
encompassing more than just parents, is obvious from a reading of article
18(2), which refers specifically, and more narrowly, to "spouses", in the context
of equality of rights, responsibilities towards their children and possible
dissolution of a union. Thus "family" cohesion, as articulated in the first part
of article 31(a), must refer to siblings and to members of the extended family,
such as grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins and so forth. As Mutua points out:
"At the root were structures of social and political organization, informed
by gender and age, which served to enhance solidarity and ensure the
existence of the community into perpetuity. The Kikuyu of Kenya, for
example, achieved a two-tiered form of community organization: at the base
was the family group composed of blood relatives, namely a man and his wife
or wives, their children, and grand-children, and often great grand-children;
the second tier consisted of the clan, a combination of several family groups
bearing the same name and believed to have descended from one ancestor".7 4
The duty to work towards the cohesion of the family is underpinned by the
centrality of the extended family in African custom and practice. The
extended family is indeed the glue binding social, economic and political
life in African tradition. As Mutua continues, "relationships, rights, and
obligations flowed from these organizational structures, giving the
community cohesion and viability". 75 Hence, most individual duties, for
adults and children alike, attached at the family and kinship levels, and were
usually identifiable through naming: an aunt was expected to act like a
mother, an uncle like a father. This is the basis of the saying, found in many
African cultures, that it takes a whole village to raise a child.76 Ncube is of the
view that the African Children's Charter lays greater stress (than the CRC) on
the role of the family and seems to view it as a centre for the production,
processing, development and defence of African traditional and "cultural
values ... the African conceptions of children's rights recognize that the family
constructs and becomes guardian of society's cultural values and norms...". 77
In this regard, the word "cohesion" assumes some importance. 78 The
nature of the duty envisaged by article 31(a) is not to work for (a crude and
74 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 361.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ncube "Recognition and monitoring", above at note 71 at 612.
78 Kamchedzera "The complementarity", above at note 72, points out that African
cultures and traditions, though varying from area to area, are generally unique in
that they are traditionally partly premised on social cohesion and communalism.
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mischievous rendition of the scope of the obligation) the family. Rather, the
objective of the child's efforts is the cohesion or unity of his kinship circle,
an entirely laudable objective even in western terms. The underlying idea is
the prevention of the atomization of individuals into socially unviable,
unconnected and ultimately disintegrated 79 structures: the polar opposite
of the African Children's Charter's underlining of the family as the natural
unit and basis of society.
The question may be posed whether the duty to work for the cohesion of
the family is merely a moral duty which is legally unenforceable, or
whether it can be construed properly as a legal duty.80 Mutua guides us to
the understanding that, whilst, in western terms, the duty might be
regarded as of moral value only, viewed from the perspective of African
kinship structures (even in modernizing or modernized parts of the
continent), duties are to be regarded essentially as "rights which each
kinship member customarily possesses, and duties which each kinship
member has toward his kin...".8 1 Expressed differently, the right of one
kinship member is the duty of another, and the duty of the other kinship
member is the right of the former. Sudarkasa and Cobbah thematically
group the principles maintaining the kinship system around respect,
restraint, responsibility and reciprocity. In a very real sense, "entitlements
and obligations form the very basis of the kinship system".8 2 There is no
denying that the "family" and kinship networks occupy a special place in
African philosophy, culture and jurisprudence. As expressed recently by
chief justice Pius Langa of the South African Constitutional Court, "[t]he
notion that we are not islands unto ourselves is central to the under-
standing of the individual in African thought. This is often expressed in the
phrase umuntu mgumuntu ngabantu which emphasizes communality and the
interdependence of the members of the community and that every
individual is an extension of others".8 3
Hence the duty towards the family is clearly more than a moral one, given
that it is the family structure and allocation of roles that define and
institutionalize social organization and political life.8 4
79 The word "disintegrated" is the antonym of "cohesive".
80 See Gose The African Charter, above at note 14 at 40-41, for an overview of this debate
and his conclusion that the "stated duty of the child is of a merely persuasive nature
and can hardly be enforced by legal means".
81 J Cobbah "African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective" (1987)
9 Human Rights Quarterly 309 at 321.
82 Ibid.
83 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and 3 Others v Navaneethum Pillay and 3 Others case no
CCT51106 (Constitutional Court), October 2007 at para 53.
84 The notion that the child's duty to work for the cohesion of the family can be
considered as being legally enforceable is supported by developments in interna-
tional human rights law. No longer can the claim be made that rights are enforceable
only against states, as international human rights law has moved towards holding
individuals, corporations and other private actors accountable.
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Moving to the consideration of the child's duties within the context of the
immediate family, article 19(1) of the African Children's Charter enshrines
the child's rights to parental care and protection, and also encapsulates the
principle that separation of a child from his or her parents should not
occur against the child's will, save where this is in the best interests of the
child. This can be regarded as the corollary of the child's duty provided for
in article 31(a): the child's duty towards his family and parents does not
exist in the abstract, but is linked to the duties of parents, and others who
are responsible for the child, to raise that child to adulthood to the best of
their abilities and capacities.
The reciprocal nature of the duties and responsibilities between parent
and child in the family context is further evident from article 20,85 which
provides for the duty of care-givers to carry out the tasks associated with a
child's upbringing and development, provided that the child's best
interests are central to the child-rearing endeavour. Even parental
discipline is subject to limitation: it must be "administered with
humanity" and "in a manner consistent with the inherent dignity of the
child".8 6 The reciprocity of obligations imposed upon children and parents
as bearers of rights and responsibilities supports the view that the duties of
a child are no less legal in nature than those imposed by the African
Children's Charter upon parents.8 7
Finally, Mutua points out that "unlike the West, kinship terminologies in
Africa relate to actual duties and obligations borne by members.
Furthermore, the terminologies are more encompassing: aunts and
mothers, for example, have similar roles within the kinship unit,
regardless of biological parentage. The same is true of uncles and older
cousins"88 (emphasis added). This too underlines the legal character of
this obligation.
The duty to respect his parents, elders and superiors at all times
A jaundiced reading of this duty would subject children to unquestioning
obedience in the face of repressive and authoritarian kinship and clan
structures. Van Bueren, for example, complains that the responsibility is
85 The authors therefore cannot agree with Chirwa's assertion that "as regards the
duties of children ... these seem not to be correlative of any rights stipulated in the
Charter ... ". See Chirwa "The merits and demerits", above at note 14 at 169.
86 Art 20(1)(c) of the African Children's Charter.
87 Raoul Intudi points out that, in pre-colonial African societies, children were prized as
an asset to the family and all family members were responsible for the protection of
children. He notes further the positive consequence inherent in providing for
children's duties towards their families, in that the child is not merely an object upon
whom protection and welfare is bestowed, but an actor, a subject, upon whom the
responsibility to promote the overall well-being of the family unit is placed. See
generally R Intudi "The application of the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child in Africa: When the law is tested by reality" in A Alen et al (eds) The UN
Children's Rights Convention: Theory Meets Practice (2007, Intersentia) 23.
88 Cobbah "African values and the human rights debate", above at note 81 at 320.
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too "unquestioning and general", 89 leading Gose to characterize the phrase
as constituting a duty of obedience.9 0 Even Chirwa, an Africanist if ever
there was one, is mildly discouraging about this particular duty, arguing
that it "may undermine the child's right to participate in decision making
in matters affecting the child in particular and in other matters in
general". 91 Ncube is cautious in his assessment, citing the fear that the duty
to respect parents could easily be relied upon to curtail children's rights to
freedom of expression, privacy and participation in decision-making.9 2
These views, we would argue, are hardly a fair interpretation, and
somewhat misconstrue the positive values that the provision seeks to
promote. Further, as mentioned above, the duties in article 31 are expressly
subject to the limitation of rights contained elsewhere in the African
Children's Charter; hence tyrannical and despotic parental or elder
practices are impermissible. Even more telling, the respect due by children
is also subject to respect for their participation rights (article 4), the
corollary of which is the parental duty to accord due weight to children's
views in accordance with their evolving age and capacity. Thus the African
Children's Charter is clear that the protection of the rights and welfare of
the child involves duties on everyone (preamble), and this should surely
include children as beneficiaries of the care and protection bestowed upon
them through the various provisions of the African Children's Charter.
Kenyatta writes that "early and late, by rules of conduct in individual
instances, by the sentiment of the group in which he lives, by rewards and
punishments and fears of ceremonial uncleanness, the younger generation
learns the respect and obedience due to parents. The older generation do
likewise". 93 This matrix of group solidarity revolves around respect, based
on: seniority in age; restraint, or the balancing of individual rights with the
requirements of the group; responsibility, which requires commitment to
work with and help others in return for security; and reciprocity, through
which generous acts are returned. 94 This basic philosophy is supported by
Mutua, citing the concept of ujamaa, the Kiswahili concept for kinship,
which was based on three principles: (i) respect, where each family member
recognizes the place and rights of others within the family; (ii) common
ownership of property, that all must have the same basic necessities; and
(iii) obligation to work, that every family member has the right to eat and to
shelter but also the obligation to work.
The duty to respect parents, elders and superiors is exactly the kind of
positive tradition that the African Children's Charter identifies as
constituting an asset in the upbringing of African children. It does not
89 Van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child, above at note 71 at 76.
90 Ibid. See also Gose "The African Charter", above at note 14 at 40.
91 Chirwa "The merits and demerits", above at note 14 at 169.
92 Ncube "Recognition and monitoring", above at note 71 at 612.
93 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 363, citing J Kenyatta Facing Mount
Kenya (1953, Secker and Warburg) 1 at 115.
94 Cobbah "African values and the human rights debate", above at note 81 at 322.
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entail docility, nor unquestioning subservience. It encapsulates the widely
shared value that age brings with it wisdom, knowledge and experience,
and that this requires that seniors be given due credit. In the words of
Justice Sachs, "[tihe choice is not between total subordination to elders on
the one hand, and absolute autonomy leading to disrespect on the other,
but a harmonization of traditional respect for elders with enjoyment of the
freedoms and right to development set out in the other provisions of the
Charter" .95
The opposite of the "duty to respect" is a "licence to disrespect" and
surely, seen this way, the formulation of the African Children's Charter
drives home the point that the intention of the drafters was not to silence
children, but rather to celebrate the positive aspects of African child-rearing
practices in nurturing a respectful society.
The duty to assist ... in case of need
Few could argue that children have an obligation to assist their families, to
the extent of their capacity to do so, in times of need. Mutua puts it in
strong terms, albeit that his discussion revolves around the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights: "Parents, for example, are owed a duty of
respect and maintenance by their children. Crippling economic problems
do not allow African states to contemplate some of the programs of the
welfare state. The care of the aged and needy falls squarely on family and
community members. This requirement - a necessity today - has its roots in
the past: it was unthinkable to abandon a parent or relative in need".96
Nor is assistance limited to economic or material assistance in the actual
wording of the African Children's Charter: it should include emotional and
psycho-social support and mention has been made of the duty to assist sick
family members, particularly apt in the era of the HIV pandemic.97 Gose
makes an important point in this regard: this duty does not render
children "substitute adults in their actions", but rather they support adults
in fulfilling their duties towards the family and in coping with their
functions.98 He notes that such interpretation is fully compatible with the
other provisions that the African Children's Charter enshrines.
Assistance given by children to their families is a familiar concept in
municipal legal systems. In Roman-Dutch law, which informed the legal
systems of much of southern Africa, 99 a duty of support rests upon children
towards their parents, a duty which persists into adulthood, when parents
grow old and unable to support themselves. In customary law, the duty of
support is particularly well elaborated and, although customary law is not
static and evolves over time in different contexts, modern day perversions,
95 A Sachs, justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in an e-mail comment
dated 13 November 2007 (copy on file with authors).
96 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 369.
97 Gose The African Charter, above at note 14 at 41.
98 Ibid.
99 South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana.
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such as dispossession and property grabbing or abandoning the sick and
elderly, are not true reflections of the principle of communitarianism that
is the hallmark of the African ethic.
The duty of the child to serve his national community by placing his
physical and intellectual abilities at its service
International and regional human rights law does not prohibit children
from ever engaging in any kind of work. The same is true of the African
Children's Charter. Article 15(1) of the charter protects every child "... from
all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely
to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's physical, mental, spiritual,
moral, or social development" (emphasis added). When activists speak of
abolishing child labour, they are talking about protecting children from
harm. In an implied support of the duty of the child to serve his national
community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service,
Human Rights Watch observes that "[i]n some cases, a child's work can be
helpful to him or her and to the family; working and earning can be a
positive experience in a child's growing up. This depends largely on the age
of the child, the conditions in which the child works, and whether work
prevents the child from going to school". 100
Therefore, a clear distinction needs to be made between child work, on
the one hand, with which the African Children's Charter does not have a
problem, and child labour and its worst forms (including the use of
children as soldiers), on the other, where a policy of "zero tolerance" is
advocated. The kind of work envisaged by the African Children's Charter -by
imposing a duty on the child to serve his/her national community by
placing his or her physical and intellectual abilities at its service - is the non-
harmful child "labour", which is often part-time and does not preclude
educational opportunities.
Children's involvement in the community, as a duty, could take different
forms. The work for his/her community, which reflects the concept of
"national service" for example, could utilize traditional notions in
addressing famine, public works and community self-help projects. 101 It
could also relate to the protection of the environment by the child. In fact,
some domestic laws in Africa, for example the Constitution of Ghana, place
a duty on everyone to look after the environment. 102 Thus, for instance, the
child could take part in environment conserving activities, such as planting
trees. In fact, article 11(2)(g) of the African Children's Charter, on "the aims
of education", indicates that "[t]he education of the child shall be directed
to the development of respect for the environment and natural resources".
This duty of the child could therefore be looked upon as reinforcing the
100 Human Rights Watch Child Labour available at: <http://hrw.org/children/labor.htm>
(last accessed 3 October 2007).
101 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 375.
102 Constitution of Ghana, art 41(k).
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right that a child has to education which is directed, inter alia, to the
development of respect for the environment.
Central to the duty of the child to serve his/her community should also be
the valuable contribution that it makes to each individual child's personal
growth and cognitive development, which could be labelled as one of the
objectives of the African Children's Charter. Such service can also be
beneficial to children by giving them an income, a sense of accomplish-
ment, and useful work-related and social skills that will be of benefit to
them in their future lives.
The CRC declares that the "child should be fully prepared to live an
individual life in society, and be brought up in the spirit of the ideals
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the
spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity". 103 A
similar message is contained in the African Children's Charter. 10 4 In other
words, children must be raised in the consciousness that their energy and
talents should also be devoted to the service of others, as stated in the 1959
UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child. 0 5
Nonetheless, under the guise of the duty of the child to serve his national
community, states and communities cannot impose or leave a gap for child
labour. On the contrary, according to the charter, states parties are
required to control and fight against child labour, through laws which
provide for compulsory full-time education until a certain age'0 6 and a
minimum age for employment. 10 7 In addition, as argued above in the
context of the ACHPR, the duty of the child to serve his national community
can neither be deployed to curtail the right of freedom of movement of the
child nor be read to impose a blanket obligation to work. As a matter of
fact, any construction of the duty which goes against the best interests of
the child principle, and other provisions of the African Children's Charter,
cannot be accommodated.
Mention must also be made of the laudable characteristic of article 31(b),
in that it recognizes not only the physical, but also the intellectual capacity of
the child to serve his national community. This is indicative of a child-
centred approach, which sees children as capable of developing their minds
in society with others and to grow into citizens participating in public life,
and not merely to be mindless consumers. Clearly, it is through civic
participation that children are empowered to take greater responsibility for
the exercise of their own rights, as they gain confidence and competence to
make informed choices and contribute to community debates.108
103 Para 7 of the preamble to the CRC.
104 Paras 5 and 6 of the African Children's Charter.
105 Thorgeirsdottir Article 13, above at note 69 at 2.
106 See art 11 of the African Children's Charter.
107 See art 15 of the African Children's Charter.
108 G Lansdown Promoting Children's Participation in Democratic Decision-Making (February
2001, Innocenti Insight, UNICEF) at 6.
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The duty of the child to preserve and strengthen social and national
solidarity
Although the notion of a "nation state" 10 9 is fast disappearing in Africa (if it
ever existed at all), social and national solidarity plays a major role in the
day to day functioning of communities and the state. The concept of ubuntu
is central to African societies and nations: a metaphor which emphasizes
communality and the interdependence of the members of the community,
and that every individual is an extension of others. It describes group
solidarity, especially where such group solidarity is central to the survival of
communities with scarce resources. The consciousness of separateness,
otherness, and division between ethnic, cultural, and racial communities
within Africa which had been nurtured by colonialism and apartheid is a
fact that should be confronted on all fronts. 110
The duty to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity could
be anchored in both positive and negative obligations. The duty to
"preserve" mainly entails an obligation not to tamper with the status
quo. Even in ordinary parlance, to "preserve" is to "maintain", to
"conserve" or to "safeguard". This means that the duty to preserve fits
squarely within the so-called "negative duties". On the other side of the
coin is the duty to "strengthen", which requires action, and is often
labelled a "positive duty" in legal literature.1 '
As a positive duty, the child needs to promote a multi-cultural society
based on dignity, humaneness, respect and so forth. These could be taken as
the generalvalues central to social and national solidaritywhich mayform the
basis of a social and national consensus in the child's community. As a
negative duty, on the other hand, none of the child's activities should erode,
nullify or even compromise positive aspects ofanyvalue system in society and
the nation. These general statements are explained and concretized below.
As already alluded to above, four general principles underpin the African
Children's Charter, one of which is non-discrimination. The right against
discrimination could be a good example to assist in elaborating the child's
duty to preserve social and national solidarity; this is because of its broad
application, as it cannot be invoked independently, but must have regard to
the range of "rights set forth in the Charter".112
As can be discerned from article 3 of the African Children's Charter,
discrimination may have many perpetrators. The state, parents or
guardians, and other individuals in society, may all contribute to
discrimination against children. 113 This last category includes the media
109 One that represents the same religion, ethnic group, culture, and so forth.
110 This does not in anyway detract from the fact that individuals and communities have the
right to maintain their own cultural uniqueness. This accords with an individual's
freedom to organize his or her life in ways that diverge from the national standard.
111 For a discussion of positive and negative duties, see HM Maim "Between the horns of
the negative-positive duty debate" (1991) 61 Philosophical Studies 187.
112 Art 3 of the African Children's Charter.
113 S Besson "The principle of non-discrimination in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child" (2005) 13 International Journal of Children's Rights 433 at 449.
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and other social groups, such as religious lobbies, which contribute to
entrenching biases against children in social attitudes. 114 However, for the
purpose of this article, the most interesting are child perpetrators: children
themselves being the source of discrimination against other children.
Africa represents societies with their ethnic, cultural and linguistic
heterogeneity, 1 5 a trait that sometimes proves to be a challenge for
fundamental cohesion. In this context, the African child's duty to preserve
social and national solidarity entails that he or she does not discriminate
against other children on the basis of any of the prohibited grounds and other
related criteria identified by article 3 of the African Children's Charter. It is
important to stress that the right against discrimination applies irrespective of
budgetary resources," 6 and to each child within the state party's jurisdiction.
If the duty of the African child to preserve social and national solidarity is
to be given practical applicability, discrimination against refugee children,
disabled children, the girl child, minority children and so forth by other
children could violate this provision. Discrimination perpetrated by
children against children, be it overt or covert, offends the human dignity
of the discriminated child, and is capable of undermining or even
destroying social and national solidarity.
As a positive duty, viewed from the angle of post-conflict situations, the
duty to strengthen social and national solidarity could entail that the child
take part, for instance, in truth and reconciliation as well as traditional conflict
resolution fora. Experience from countries such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda is
instructive in this regard.1 17 However, again, the best interests of the child, as
well as the evolving "capacity of the child" principle, should be the main
criteria against which to assess the participation of children in these fora.
With regard to the post-conflict scenario, present day experiences in Africa
(and elsewhere) show that peacemaking does more than end war; it lays the
normative ground for transition and sets the agenda for peacetime.118 The
114 Ibid.
115 Contrary to what Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 347, argues in the
milieu of pre-colonial Africa.
116 Both the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women have highlighted that the
attainment of the principle of non-discrimination is not subject to progressive
realization.
117 See, for instance, UNICEF "Children and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
Sierra Leone" (2001), available at: <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/SierraLeone-
TRCReport.pdf> (last accessed 3 October 2007).
118 1 Cohn "The protection of children in peacemaking and peacekeeping processes" (1999)
12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 129 at 131. This is because peace processes have
sometimes performed as constitutional conferences in which key actors strive to define
the political, social and economic framework for a new social and legal order.
Peacemakers do not adequately address children's needs for several reasons: lack of
awareness of the nature and extent of the impact of conflict on children; ineffective
lobbying by child welfare advocates; and lack of access to information on child-
conscious policies and programmes that should be adapted or avoided in light of
experiences in other contexts.
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international community, states and institutions, local civil society and
international nongovernmental organizations come together in peace
processes to determine how post-conflict society can reincorporate warriors
to civilian life, facilitate resettlement of the displaced and provide for the
return of refugees, advance a national agenda reconciling opposing factions
and social or ethnic groups, allocate resources for development, ensure
equal access to justice, and remedy past injustices. In the majority of cases, if
not in all, this is an exercise necessary for re-establishing (preserving) social
and national solidarity, in which children should play a vital role.
The duty of children to undertake these activities should also be
interpreted as placing a duty on the state, parents or guardians, and
society at large, to facilitate and assist children in fulfilling their duties. The
effective accomplishment of the duty of African children to preserve and
strengthen social and national solidarity might sometimes be facilitated
better if children are structured and organized as, increasingly, mechan-
isms are being developed throughout the world to enable such participa-
tion.119 A good example is children's parliaments.
In light of the African child's duty to make a significant contribution to
the political agenda and enhance social and national solidarity, decision
makers should demonstrate that they are willing to listen, and to give
consideration, to the proposals and issues raised by children, and act where
possible. 120 This guarantee would bolster children's own sense of demo-
cratic responsibility, as they would recognize that they are being taken
seriously.121
A Save the Children report, Shaping a countrys future,1 22 provides guide-
lines for including young people in the formation of National Plans of
Action. According to the guidelines, children must, among other things,
strive to be responsible and disciplined, show respect for government
officials, and respect children who speak other languages or are from
backgrounds different to their own.123
Finally, there is a direct relationship between the child's duty to preserve
and strengthen social and national solidarity and the right to freedom of
expression, 124 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,125
119 Albeit often patchily and with varying degrees of effectiveness, on the one hand, and
tokenism, on the other.
120 Lansdown Promoting Children's Participation, above at note 108 at 19.
121 Ibid. However, the writer also cautions against treating "the voice of young people as
a panacea", for "there is plenty of evidence here that simply establishing
participatory structures and opportunities for young people is no guarantee of their
effectiveness".
122 Save the Children "Shaping a country's future with children and young people", available
at: <http:ifwww.childrights.orgpahome2.0.nsf6b9cc825455bcb7788256a730065d026
46dlacfac802e91088256c93007ada25$FILE/Summary%2OGuideC20for%2OGovernments.
doc> (last accessed 10October 2007).
123 Ibid.
124 Art 7 of the African Children's Charter.
125 Id at art 9.
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the right to freedom of association,1 26 and the right of access to
information. Article 11 of the African Children's Charter on the right to
education is also very important. States parties to the African Children's
Charter should protect, promote and fulfil these and other related rights in
order to allow children to undertake their duty efficiently.
The duty of the child to preserve and strengthen African cultural
values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit
of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and to contribute to the
moral well-being of society
Preservation and strengthening of African cultural values in relations with
other members of the society
A harmonious reading of the first part of this statement, consistent with
the provisions of the African Children's Charter generally, would require
understanding that what is being sought is not the preservation of African
cultural values in fossilized form, or in contradistinction to other rights,
such as freedom from being subjected to harmful cultural and social
practices, but the promotion of the child's positive relations with other
members of society. The first goal, of course, is the integration of the child
into the polity as a well-functioning member of society, able to contribute
to the social capital necessary to ensure a peaceful and productive society.
The value of building social capital amongst youth from an early age is self-
evident. Social capital entails the production of a shared belief in the
"good" attaching to citizenship, the "value added" being found in
belonging and contributing. Its antithesis is pursuit of naked self-interest,
trampling upon the rights of others, wanton violence or the destruction of
community assets (such as the environment) for one's own gain.
Hence, the preservation and strengthening of African cultural values in
day to day dealings with the elements of his society, requires that the child
should give as well as take. He/she should be provided with benefits (such as
education), as well as benefiting from and using to the optimum the
opportunities provided, in a spirit of reciprocity, so as to counter
individualism and egocentrism, which are decidedly "un-African", at least
in theory. As Mutua notes, in the context of the "mother charter", the
ACHPR, "by rejecting the egotistical individual whose only concern is
fulfilling self, article 27(2) raises the level of care owed to neighbours and
the community", 127 thereby creating the social cohesion required for
viability.
The reading of this phrase that we propose does not, therefore, open the
way to justify harmful cultural practices, such as female genital mutilation,
debt bondage and servitude, or hazardous child labour. Our interpretation,
that the African cultural practices referred to in the first part of article 31(d)
126 Id at art 8.
127 Mutua "The Banjul Charter", above at note 46 at 369.
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concern the communitarian facets of social life in the African context, is
reinforced by the second part of that article, which we consider next.
Spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation
The phrase "tolerance, dialogue and consultation" in the second part of
article 31(d) gives a clue to the cultural values that are probably envisaged.
"Tolerance" speaks to accommodation of difference and non-discrimina-
tion. "Dialogue" refers to non-confrontational discussion, and "consulta-
tion" necessarily implies participation, rather than exclusion. These are
precisely the kind of peaceable, participative and constructive approaches
to problem solving, dispute resolution and community organization that
characterized pre-colonial African societies. So, for instance, restorative
justice is being reintroduced and fostered in many emerging child justice
systems in Africa, as a participative way of redressing the harm caused by
youth offending. This is on the premise that dialogue about the causes of
the incident between child, victim and elders has echoes in traditional
practice. 128 Restorative justice not only proceeds from a philosophical
premise rooted in communitarianism and ubuntu, but as a dispute
resolution process also entails the child assuming responsibility for his or
her misdeeds, with the support of families, extended kin and the broader
community. Furthermore, seen against the backdrop of war, conflict and
strife that have prevailed (and continue to do so) in Africa, the promotion
and fostering of non-bellicose, non-aggressive and non-prejudiced relation-
ships between children themselves, and between them and their societies,
can only be regarded as a highly beneficial and valuable addition to the
human rights agenda.
Contribution to the moral well-being of society
The child's duty to contribute to the moral well-being of society could be
viewed as vague. Furthermore, it could point to a conservative agenda, one
not in keeping with the modern era, its technologies and its risks (not the
least of which is HIV/Aids). It could rightly be questioned whether children
can be expected to shoulder the custodianship of society's moral well-being,
when they themselves are supposed to be educated in order to develop
sound moral values when they in turn grow up. A further question that
may be controversial is, what exactly is meant by the "moral well-being of
society", the content of which may mean very different things to people
from different religions, cultures, backgrounds and so forth.
Two points, however, must be made. First, the moral well-being of society
must be "read off' the background established by the African Children's
Charter and the African Charter. In other words, it is not about this or that
moral value system, but about a morality that results in societal well-being:
128 See A Skelton "The influence of the theory and practice of restorative justice in South
Africa with special reference to child justice" (unpublished LLD thesis, University of
Pretoria, 2005).
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peace, solidarity, non-discrimination, respect, and promotion of equality
and dignity. Hence this provision does not speak to one specific moral value
system, or to "the moral high ground" of one or another belief system, but
rather to the elements that combine to constitute a moral society for all,
one in which violence is abhorred, constitutional democracy respected,
concern for the human rights and dignity of fellow human beings
evidenced, and egalitarian economic regimes advanced.
Secondly, it cannot be thought that children alone bear responsibility for
society's moral well-being, as this duty rests on adults too, in accordance
with the ACHPR. Thus the suggestion that this duty is inappropriately
placed upon children cannot be sustained.
The duty of the child to preserve and strengthen the independence
and the integrity of his country
The African Children's Charter requires the child to preserve and
strengthen the independence and the integrity of his country.129 Of course
there is a wide range of "dos and don'ts" that reinforce this provision. To
start with, a fitting question in this regard is: "what are those acts that a
child should not do which can negatively affect the independence and
integrity of his country?" The answer to this question could be long, but we
attempt below to provide some "classical" examples.
There is no need for a reminder that the child is a member of society, a
civic participant. So, just like every other individual/group member in a
society, the child has the duty not to commit offences against his or her
country, such as treason, or any offences against the constitutional order,
which are often regarded as public offences, or crimes against the public
dimension of the community or state. In the context of contemporary
political and social issues, the "war on terror" springs to mind: every child will
have the duty not to advocate fanaticism, tribalism, social or ethnic tension,
racism, or xenophobia, under the guise of exercising his/her freedom of
expression, which can compromise the integrity of his/her country.
The duty to "strengthen" the independence and integrity of his/her
country, however, indicates a "positive obligation", which requires the
child to act in a certain manner. In this context, it is important to recount
briefly the significant contribution which children have made to the
liberation struggle against colonialism in a number of African countries.
The struggle of South African children to end apartheid is an example
worthy of particular mention. 130
129 Art 31(e) of the African Children's Charter.
130 The Day of the African Child marks a 1976 march in Soweto, South Africa, when thousands
of black school children took to the streets to protest against the inferior quality of their
education and to demand their right to be taught in their own language. Hundreds of
young boys and girls were shot at; in the two weeks of protest that followed, more than a
hundred people were killed and more than a thousand were injured. 15 years later, in
1991, the OAU immortalized the Soweto Uprising by declaring 16 June the Day of the
African Child. This declaration marked an official recognition of the children's
contribution to the struggle against apartheid.
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A word of caution, however, is apposite at this juncture. This provision
cannot be read as permitting children to become soldiers in order to
promote the independence and integrity of their country. Such an
interpretation would be a cynical misreading of the African Children's
Charter, especially since article 22 unequivocally addresses the prohibition
on the use of children as soldiers.131 As states parties have the obligation to
"ensure" that children (by definition persons below the age of 18) do not
take direct part in hostilities, there is no room for an interpretation which
would allow children to become soldiers to fight for the independence and
integrity of their country.
It is also important to mention that promoting independence and
integrity of one's country does not necessarily call for an armed struggle. In
fact, African values, such as negotiation and compromise, dictate that
armed struggle be a measure of last resort. If the duty to "... preserve and
strengthen African cultural values in his relations with other members of
the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and to
contribute to the moral well-being of society 132 means anything at all,
confrontational mechanisms, particularly armed struggle, should be
avoided by the African child as much as possible.
The duty of the child to contribute to the best of his abilities at all
times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African
unity
Before an attempt is made to chart what is meant by the duty of the child
"to contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the
promotion and achievement of African unity",' 3 3 the historical background
to the African Children's Charter should be briefly mentioned. The drafting
of the African Children's Charter took place in the late 1980s when a
number of African countries were still not independent. 3 4 It is also
important to remember that the charter was drafted under the aegis of the
now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU). One of the main
objectives of the OAU was "to promote the unity and solidarity of the
African States".1 35 Therefore it was at the time fair to include a duty on the
part of the child to promote African unity.
The fact that the duty "to contribute ... to the promotion and
achievement of African unity" under the African Children's Charter traces
its background mainly from the objective of the OAU does not mean that
the objective is obsolete for present day Africa. As a matter of fact, the
Constitutive Act which established the African Union reiterates, as one of its
131 Art 22(2) reads: "States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures
to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular,
from recruiting any child."
132 Art 31(d) of the African Children's Charter.
133 Id at art 31(0.
134 In 1989, countries such as Namibia and South Africa were still not independent.
135 Art II of the African Children's Charter.
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objectives, the achievement of "... greater unity and solidarity between the
African countries and the peoples of Africa". 136
A close reading of article 31(o of the African Children's Charter leads one
to observe that 137 the child has the duty to contribute only to the "best of
his abilities". This is mainly a reiteration of the limitation contained in the
general preambular part of article 31. However, what should be noteworthy
is that the child has the duty to contribute "at all times and at all levels".
An evaluation of the phrase "at all levels", in particular, is very
interesting and has the great potential to advance the participation rights
of children. Accordingly, by taking stock of current political issues in Africa,
such as the "Grand Debate on the Union Government" by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government of the African Union, children should be
allowed to assume their duty and contribute, to the best of their abilities, to
the debate. Depending on the "best of their abilities", children might be
called upon to contribute to the work of the Pan-African Parliament, the
New Partnership for Africa's Development and other similar initiatives
within the continent which are ultimately tailored to promote and achieve
African unity. The role, or one could say the duty, of children in the sub-
regional social, economic and political integration process is also worthy of
mention.
CONCLUSION
It was in order to give the CRC specific application in the African context
that the OAU adopted the African Children's Charter, the first regional
treaty on the human rights of the child. The African Children's Charter not
only reflects an African normative consensus on children's rights, but also
represents an attempt to Africanize, and place within the African cultural
context, the children's rights discourse. That is principally why it provides
for the responsibilities of children to their parents, communities and
society as a whole, relative to their age and ability.
In connection with this, it may also be important to note that the duties
of the child under article 31 are placed as the final substantive provision of
the African Children's Charter. It seems that the drafters did this
consciously,138 to underline the point that responsibilities are complemen-
tary to rights, rather than undermining them. We should conclude that the
drafters did not intend governments to make the enjoyment of human
rights dependent on the fulfilment of duties, but rather saw duties as the
balancing elements to reinforce rights.
136 Art 3(a) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
137 In addition to the limitations provided by the preambular part of the provision ("age
and ability, and such limitations as may be contained in the present Charter").
138 Personal communication from W Njuguna, deputy director, African Network for the
Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect, which had a key role in
assisting with the drafting of the African Children's Charter.
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We have argued that, despite the African Children's Charter's recognition
of duties on the part of children, it does not lose sight of its initial
recognition that "... the child, due to the needs of his physical and mental
development requires particular care with regard to health, physical,
mental, moral and social development and requires legal protection in
conditions of freedom, dignity and security". 13 9 We have suggested, too,
that the internal limitations under article 31 are tailored carefully to make
it impossible for anyone to demand that the child undertake his or her
duties in a way that violates his or her other rights under the charter. As we
have attempted to illustrate, the charter has to be viewed not as a
compendium of discrete provisions, but as an integrated document with
enumerated rights (and responsibilities) being viewed both as interdepen-
dent, and as determinant of their scope and normative content. In support
of this position, article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
entrenches that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ... in the light of
its object and purpose" (emphasis added). Since the object and purpose of the
African Children's Charter is the advancement of the rights of the African
child, the language of duties should not be used to limit or violate
children's rights.
In conclusion, we have argued that critics who have suggested that the
provisions of the African Children's Charter detailing the responsibility of
the child are redundant, vague, open to misinterpretation, or provide a
licence for harmful practices which violate children's rights, have
misconceived both the spirit and intention of the drafters, as well as the
actual text of the provisions. We have suggested, by contrast, that article 31
represents a valuable addition to the international human rights agenda,
and that a purposive interpretation of its constituent parts reveals that
children should be required to play a role at family, community, national
and continental levels, in accordance with their age and maturity as they
grow up, as part and parcel of their heritage, empowerment and developing
citizenship.
If the language of duties is to be accorded its rightful place in the
children's rights lexicon, article 31, and the ideals that it envisages, must be
situated within a positive developmental context that aims to nurture child
participation, cherish communitarian traditions, further peace-building
and harmonious social development, as well as foster African unity.
Our vision is of the ideal of the dutiful child: a girl or boy who is
conscious of his or her place in the community in which he or she is being
raised, who is socially concerned, with a strong sense of morality and
justice, and who strives to use, to the best of his or her abilities, the
opportunities that arise. Our child is proud of his or her culture, but at the
same time respectful of the culture of others. He or she has a natural
respect for those who gave him or her life, and is keen to make a
contribution not only to his or her own growth and development, but also
139 Para 6 of the preamble to the African Children's Charter.
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to the family and the community at large. Finally, in the bigger scheme, our
African child is committed to observing civic responsibilities, and to
participating in the unity and development of his or her nation and
continent.
